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Territorial divisions in Europe
Introduction
Elisabeth Bonnet-Pineau et Christian Vandermotten
1 The  study  of  territorial  divisions  is  expected  to  fall  within  the  remit  of  political
geography, as it implies an analysis of relations between power and territories as political
constructs. However, given the multi-faceted nature of the « territorial paradigm », we
should also look at other approaches to territoriality (M. Vanier, 2010). 
2 The articles compiled in this issue tackle territorial divisions from two angles, drawing
comparisons  between Western and Eastern European states,  including countries  that
joined the European Union in 2004 (Poland) or 2007 (Bulgaria) in the latest rounds of
enlargement, as well as Germany and its struggle to meet the challenges of reunification
and modernisation. 
3 The first perspective looks at the territorial grids established as a result of the
emergence of nation-states, and at their contemporary legacy. 
4 The concept of the nation-state emerged in the nineteenth century, to meet the needs of
economic and political modernisation, at a time when national markets were developing
and a form of rationality had been inherited from the Century of Enlightenment. In the
early  19th century,  the  development  of  the  nation-state  involved  the  creation  of
territorial grids that facilitated political control over territories while supporting a fast-
changing economic activity, whose reality was being transformed by industrialisation and
rail transport. This process was supported by the production of cultural and ideological
frameworks based on a common language and in some cases on the construction of a
linguistic identity that attempted to eradicate dialects and regional languages. In Western
Europe, the nation-state was often built on the foundation of a lasting and deep-rooted
pairing between the state and the territory. In France and England for instance, this close
association had been constantly consolidating since the 13th century,  with the nation
developing as a concept under the Royalty. 
5 In this context the archetypal territorial unit, whose uniformity and rationality helped
shape centralised states,  was  the  French département (department).  A  product  of  the
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French revolution, it was more or less replicated in many European countries – serving as
a model for provinces in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy etc. The United Kingdom
adhered to the same model,  although its grid of counties was less homogeneous and
retained a greater formal continuity with traditional structures of organisation. In this
country the transition occurred earlier, took longer and was less radical than in France
where the Ancien Régime gave way to a Parliamentary state. 
6 Belgium provides a unique example in Western Europe of a state that developed later in
the 19th century,  as the chance result of the bourgeoisie reclaiming control after the
people’s rebellion. An agreement was passed between neighbouring powers without any
truly  national  initiative,  and an unsuccessful  attempt  was  made  to  create  a  French-
speaking nation. Belgium’s history and the part played by merchant cities makes it more
akin to central Europe countries. The industrial revolution mostly benefitted the Walloon
region while the rural Flanders, more reliant on textile, was declining. However between
the two World Wars, the country’s industrial production shifted from Wallonia to the
Flanders and the past development pattern was altogether reversed after World War Two.
This evolution undermined the national construction process, which had already been
threatened  from  the  mid-19th century  by  Flemish  independence  claims,  purportedly
based on cultural grounds but also due to economic frustrations. After the 1960s, Belgium
went from a unified heritage to embarking on institutional  processes that led to the
introduction  of  language-based  divisions  –  to  the  point  where  the  language  border
became an intangible internal border in 1962 – and of a conflicted federal regime in 1995
that proceeded to dissolve Belgian identity, although this identity had in actual fact never
been fully accomplished. 
7 In  Central  Europe,  the  legacy  of  past  territorial  structures  was  better  preserved.  In
Switzerland, the traditional division into cantons of varying sizes was never challenged in
spite of the creation of a modern state after the Sunderbund war. In other countries,
states were formed at a later stage: they were preceded by the development of a national
identity, taking in the local power of princes or cities by adopting a federation-based
imperial  structure,  and  thus  retaining  complex  divisions  inherited  from  the  Ancien
Regime until National-Socialism imposed a centralised regime. In both cases, the power of
local  identities  produced a  federal  structure.  However,  these  structures  are  the very
opposite of what was recently implemented in Belgium following the deconstruction of
the unified state. Such a federal organisation involved a strict division of competences
between the state and the regions: in Belgium for instance, there is no hierarchy between
the state, the Régions (regions) and the Communautés (communities), with each of these
entities given sovereignty over relevant issues. 
8 In Eastern Central Europe, the creation of the nation-state was not associated with the
same economic growth patterns as in Western Europe: this favoured the development of
national  ideologies  grounded in regional  identity,  as  was the case in Germany,  or  in
religion – which is not to say that nationalist movements were not just as vigorous in
France or in Great-Britain, although they were built on different ideological grounds. 
9 In Poland, before the country became a state and a territorial form, the nation was built
upon  a  culture,  a  “spiritual  homeland”  referring  to  a  national  space  that  had  been
dismembered,  reshaped  and  displaced  at  the  whim  of  power  relations.  The  Polish
territory is a challenge to grasp or represent on a historical scale. After its creation in the
10th century, Poland spread far out to the East between the 14th and 18th centuries, before
its territory resorbed when neighbouring powers undertook to share the region between
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them. The Polish nation was shaped around its shared history, language and cultural and
religious  values.  In  1945,  with a  remodelled configuration and a  more  homogeneous
ethnic make-up, “the new Polish state [had to] develop its territorial integration in a new
geopolitical environment” (M. Foucher, 1993).
10 Contemporary Bulgaria is the heir of the successive Bulgarian Empires that reigned from
the  7th to  the  14 th century.  Under  the  Ottoman rule,  political  control  was  based  on
religious communities as much as on territories1. Modern Bulgaria was born in 1878 from
a much smaller territory than the one the country had historically ambitioned to control. 
11 The difference between Western Europe on the one hand and Central and Western Europe
on the other is not just to do with the varying circumstances and ideological foundations
of the nation-state: it was also reinforced after World War Two by the implementation of
the Soviet spatial system which, in order to impose the centralized management of all
economic activity, designed administrative grids to implement and monitor the economic
plan. Communist regimes have not however applied a unique administrative model. The
legacy  of  pre-war  grids  persisted  in  some  cases,  although  not  everywhere.  Multiple
attempts were made at adjusting territorial divisions to the plan: territorial reform was
seen as a means of spreading the planning model. After 1945, the size, role, number and
level of territorial districts were in some cases modified up to four or five times: this
happened in Bulgaria in 1947, 1949, 1959, 1977 and 1988, and in Poland in 1954, 1975 and
1983. When the iron curtain collapsed, these countries still  carried the legacy of this
period. 
12 The  second  aspect  addressed  in  this  issue  covers  the  recent  modifications
undergone by territorial grids. These processes are expected to meet the demands
of  European  construction  and  competitiveness.  They  also  serve  the  agenda  of
resurging regional identities, perceived as an alternative to national frameworks
that  appear  less  legitimate  than  ever  in  the  context  of  current  structural
modifications. 
13 Many European countries  have delivered territorial  reform programs,  bringing about
redesigned  units  and  increased  devolution  to  better  meet  the  European  union’s
requirements  in  terms of  territorial  cohesion and competitiveness  –  or,  as  in  Spain,
Scotland and Belgium, to satisfy regionalist identity-based claims that have been filling
the gaps left by the failings of national legitimacy (see C. Vandermotten). Other smaller-
scale  reforms  have  attempted  to  address  the  inadequacies  of  municipal  divisions
inherited from a society where mobility was more limited.  The aim is to make these
divisions more operative in the context  of  general  urbanisation and metropolisation,
where services are increasingly accessed on a wider scale, creating the need for revised
funding models. For instance in France, “territory-making” is extremely popular with
national politicians, researchers and experts (M. Vanier, 2010), although paradoxically
the actual devolution of competences is much less advanced than in other countries, due
to highly centralised territorial structures the country inherited from its past. France’s
latest territorial reform was voted in 2015 and promulgated in January 2016. 
14 In Central Eastern Europe, the need to reorganise competences was associated with a
desire to break free from the Communist era grids. This has not however always led to a
genuine territorial reorganisation, as was the case in Bulgaria but not in Poland. In the
former East Germany, the changes were of course dramatic: the country was expected to
break free from the Socialist period’s spatial markers while embracing West Germany’s
federal  structure,  which  had  been  abolished  in  1952  to  make  way  for  drastic
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centralisation. The German reunification and the application of Western territorial grids
in the East has not prevented a form of marginalisation of the region, even though the
equality of living conditions was set out in the new Constitution. This quest for territorial
balance remains a considerable challenge in a country with historically strong identities
and in some cases traditions of regional independence, especially in areas that did not
belong to Prussia but had their own kings such as Saxony or Bavaria. 
15 The consolidation of first level territorial units 
16 Generally speaking, first level territorial divisions have tended to be consolidated. Over
the last few decades, this level was even in many cases built from scratch rather than just
reinforced. At the end of World War Two, in unified European states, first level divisions
formed  a  homogeneous  web  similar  to  that  of  the  French  départements.  Larger  and
sometimes more unevenly sized regions were then superimposed over this level in Italy
(with special status regions from 1946), France, Belgium, post-Franco Spain and Poland.
In post-war Germany, the return to democracy brought back the Länder (states), which
the Nazi regime had replaced with a grid of Gaue from 1934. 
17 This  tendency  towards  the  creation  of  larger  first  level  units,  followed  by  their
consolidation (which was more or less pronounced depending on countries) is linked to
various objectives.  In some cases,  it  supports (or on the contrary, aims to neutralise)
regionalist movements whose political legitimacy has become more established in Spain,
Italy, the UK, Belgium and Germany, where such movements had been repressed during
the National-Socialist period and during the Soviet era in former East Germany. More
recently, first level units have also served the purpose of meeting the requirements of the
European Union’s territorial cohesion policies: the Union boosted the regional support
programmes  of  the  past  and  since  1999,  it  has  worked  to  promote  convergence  by
reducing  development  gaps  between  the  Union’s  states  and  regions.  Finally,  large
metropolises  want  to  carve  a  place  for  themselves  in  the  international  competition
between territories by organising and supporting the development of larger metropolitan
areas. 
18 This “augmented first level” was an obvious choice in Germany: it was built upon the
federal  states’  strong identity  but  also  upon a  multi-centric  structure,  with  regional
centres based on the even allocation of Metropolregionen (metropolitan regions) across the
territory – although a dissymmetry still persists between the East and the West: it was
logical to apply this structure in the East too. 
19 In Italy,  the consolidation of the first  level  also drew from a tight network of cities,
although a North vs. South dualism remains visible in the opposition between Milan and
Rome, without mentioning Naples or Palermo. From as early as 1948, Italy defined itself
as a regional state, “rebuilding democracy through the territory” (D. Rivière, 2014). The
Christian democrats controlled every scale until 1980: it was not until the 1990s that Italy
was  able  to  consolidate  its  regional,  municipal  and  metropolitan  authorities,  whose
legitimacy was reinforced by the failure of the state. The rise of the regions is directly
correlated to the intensification of devolution. It is based on traditions linked to regional
identity,  which has  persisted  due  to  the  country’s  late  unification and thrived from
blatant regional inequalities. However, in 2014-2015, metropolises were created under the
impulse of the central state to better control the regions and limit the influence of the
Senate, which represents the regions (see D. Rivière). 
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20 In Spain, assertions of regional identity were liberalised at the fall of Franco and gave rise
to independence claims in Catalonia and the Basque country. 
21 Similar claims led to a form of “separatist” federalism in Belgium. The survival of this
model survival  appears mostly due to the fact that the capital  is  at  the heart of  the
country’s economic activity, while its area of influence is split between regions that lay
outside of the metropolis’ control. 
22 France also attempted to bring the regional level more recognition, in order to better
meet European requirements aimed at consolidating the interplay between regions and
the European Union. Another aim was to compensate for the state’s general tendency to
withdraw  from  territorial  planning  and  development,  in  an  increasingly  neo-liberal
environment.  However,  it  seems  that  the  country  interrupted  this  process  halfway
through. The devolution process initiated in 1982 and re-launched in 2004 mostly enabled
the central state to offload responsibility by transferring areas of competence onto the
local echelons, rather than defining new models of interaction and coordination between
levels of management, or between political and administrative functions (see E. Bonnet-
Pineau). 
23 France’s regional reform (law of the 16th January 2015) was designed to equip the country
with  a  new  territorial  architecture  by  creating  large  regions  and  generating
competitiveness  gains.  Another  objective  was  to  clarify  the  territorial  authorities’
respective areas of competence. However, although reducing the number of regions was
relatively  easy  (without  it  really  achieving any of  the  intended efficiency gains  in  a
demonstrable manner), suppressing the départements is not easy, as those remain a local
echelon that  grants  the population access  to national  solidarity.  The redesign of  the
regional map was in fact achieved by merging existing regions together, without affecting
any of the départements that make up these regions. 
24 The  review  of  missions  and  the  devolution  of  powers  did  not  either  bring  about  a
reorganisation of each echelon’s remit, or an increase in the regions’ budgetary capacity
or decisionary power. The allocation of roles and fields of action between the various
echelons contradicts the very principle of territorial development, according to which a
region should be able to be involved in every sector. Finally,  the financial conditions
required  for  the  completion  and  long-term  follow-up  of  projects  have  remained
undefined, jeopardising the reform’s ability to achieve its initial objectives.
25 The law of the 27th January 2014 for the modernisation of territorial public action instated
metropolises in Paris,  Lyon and Marseille  while setting out the modalities  for a  new
metropolitan  governance.  This  law  is  an  invitation  to  question  the  state’s  role  in
metropolitan governance, and question the relation between metropolises and regions.
This construction was challenging in the case of Paris, where it was affected by political,
economical and financial factors: as a capital, Paris needs to establish its relations with
both the state and the Île-de-France region. 
26 This issue does not unfortunately contain any articles about the United Kingdom, which
remains  Europe’s  most  centralised country,  with an inconsistent  management  of  the
regional  echelons  –  to  the  exclusion of  the  powers  devolved to  Scotland,  Wales  and
Northern Ireland. 
27 This  issue  of  the  relations  between  the  capital  city  and  the  rest  of  the  territory  is
particularly acute in Central Eastern Europe. In these countries,  due to the effects of
globalisation combined with the consistently poor levels of power granted by socialist
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regimes to first level urban grids, the capitals have remained the regions that enjoy the
best connection with the European space, and in a position to grow their advantage over
the rest of the country: this is for instance the case of Varsaw in Poland, or Sofia in
Bulgaria. 
28 In Central Eastern Europe (except for the former East Germany), in spite of territorial
reforms and a stated willingness to consolidate the regions’ powers, the first level has
remained weak.  This is  due to the lack of  a tradition of  devolution,  even before the
Communist  regimes were in power,  and to  the reluctance of  recently  formed states,
whose main priority remains to assert their external borders. In Poland, the number of
voïvodies was brought down to 16 in 1999, in an attempt to consolidate this first level. In
Bulgaria  however,  the  part  played  by  the  regions  remains  inconsistent  due  to  the
weakness  of  large  regional  cities,  to  the  absence  of  historical  regions  and  to  the
restriction of the regions’ remit to the sole coordination of local and national interests,
even though these units have control over the municipal echelon (see E. Boulineau). The
regions were mostly created to satisfy EUROSTAT’s demands in terms of statistics but as a
matter of fact European funds have only trickled down to the medium echelons, before
being suspended due to fraud and corruption. 
29 Mid-level divisions 
30 Most  European  countries,  except  for  the  very  smallest,  have  a  mid-level  echelon  in
between first level and local units. 
31 This  intermediate  level  has  very  little  leverage  in  federal  states:  this  is  the  case  in
Germany with the Regierungsbezirke, which only exist in the largest states. In Belgium,
province-level responsibilities have declined – in Wallonia even more so than in Flanders
–  while  Brussels  now  sits  outside  of  this  system.  There  is  no  intermediate  level  in
Switzerland. 
32 The  situation  is  similar  in  decentralised  states,  where  the  very  existence  of  an
intermediate level (formerly the known as provinces) is being challenged. In Italy this
echelon is doomed to disappear to make way for regions and metropolises;  in Spain,
autonomous “communities” have taken over the provinces. Catalonia even created its
own intermediate level, the comarcas, to challenge the legitimacy of the provinces which
are seen as a relic of the central state’s dominance (see E. Libourel).
33 Finally,  the former first  level  unit  of  the department  continues  to  exert  its  power in
France, thus reflecting the shortcomings of regional divisions. 
34 In Central Eastern Europe, the intermediate level is usually of little importance. In Poland
for instance, the 380 powiats (districts) located in between the voïvodies and the 2 478
municipalities have very little leverage (see T. Kazmarek). 
35 The local scale 
36 The local scale has often been more stable in the long term, although many countries
have merged their municipalities over the last decades. 
37 In general,  comparisons  show  a  greater  heterogeneity  between  local  administrative
districts than between municipal grids. In some countries such as the UK, local services
are  scattered  between  various  authorities;  in  others,  city  authorities  are  closely
monitored by central institutions and are seen as a mere instrument for the provision
and organisation of administrative services – this was the case for instance in Central
Eastern Europe during the Communist period. In Switzerland on the contrary, ancestral
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belonging to a municipality forms the very foundation of national citizenship, while in
Belgium municipalities benefit from a high level of autonomy. They also play a prominent
part in Italy’s recent political history, so much so that “exacerbated municipalism” has
been mentioned as an issue when, in the 1990s, the Lega del Nord introduced its brand of
“aggressive regionalism” (D. Rivière, 2015). 
38 A table  of  local  administrative  units  in  the  European union (see  J.-B.  Grison)  shows
France’s singularity, with a high number of very small districts inherited from the Ancien
Régime’s paroisses (parishes), which resisted to merger attempts. Yet as a matter of fact,
these  municipalities  are  less  autonomous  from  central  authorities  than  in  other
countries. The French’s attachment to these local districts explains their power of inertia
and longevity.  Clusters  of  municipalities  (or  intercommunalité)  has  become the  norm,
providing  a  compromise  solution  to  avoid  conflict  with  the  towns  and  their
representatives while creating structures large enough to deliver and rationalise services
to  the  population.  In  recent  years,  financial  incentives  have  also  been  created  to
encourage smaller towns to merge together. 
39 Paradoxically,  Belgian  communes,  whose  foundation  followed  the  same  model  as  the
French municipalities, underwent a general merger process in 1976, while at the same
time local authorities were granted stronger powers. Unlike in France, the local grid does
not always lie under the state’s responsibility: in Belgium, the network of municipalities
is supervised by the regions. It is managed by the federal states in Germany, where the
grid has been redesigned more or less drastically depending on the individual states: in
Rheinland-Palatinate  the  municipalities  remained  fragmented;  in  North  Rheinland-
Westphalia,  they were merged;  in Saxony-Anhalt,  the ex-GDR’s most urban state,  the
municipalities’ borders were redesigned in order to rationalise territorial organisation
for the benefit  of  central  spaces,  following the same pattern as  in North Rheinland-
Westphalia (D. Florentin). 
40 England’s centralism excludes any consistency on a regional level. The complexity and
heterogeneity of the local grid together with the proliferation of government agencies
highlight the central government’s stranglehold, which has been further reinforced by
Conservative governments whose opponents are mostly concentrated in large cities. In
this paradoxical country, the diversity of structures actually hides a centralised system –
while on the contrary,  in French-influenced continental  countries,  centralisation was
imposed through homogenisation. 
41 The most striking aspect of the mutations undergone by Central Eastern Europe is the
local  authorities’  return to  autonomy.  This  was  implemented in  Poland through the
territorial reforms of 1990, 1999 and 2011. In Bulgaria the 1999 reform, seen as a “pseudo-
reform”, was completed in 2007 with a modification of the Constitution that granted
municipalities  greater  fiscal  autonomy.  The  introduction  of  new  devolved  funding
channels for local authorities was in some cases conditional to mergers between local
entities,  as  illustrated  by  Saxony.  Paradoxically,  while  in  Central  Eastern  Europe
municipalities had lost their autonomy during the Communist period, local divisions had
remained relatively stable. 
42 To conclude, although there is unquestionably a dialectical interaction between on the
one hand management models and political/administrative divisions, and on the other
hand the production of space in its economic, social and cultural dimension (although the
two aspects, which follow timescales of their own, are never quite balanced). Politicians
sometimes overstate the real  impact of  territorial  reorganisation on the evolution of
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space. For instance when the Jacobin revolutionaries punished Lyon by making it the
préfecture of  a considerably shrunk down département,  this did not stop the city from
becoming France’s second largest metropolis. Outside of Europe, the emergence of new
capitals built straight out of the ground never posed a threat to large metropolises, which
had been historical capitals and remained the main economic centres. In Belgium, the
metropolisation of the central area around Brussels is still under way, in spite of political
decisions deliberately  aimed at  constraining the  capital’s  growth –  even when these
decisions make territorial management more difficult (C. Vandermotten). As a matter of
fact,  the  willingness  to  rationalise  territorial  management  and  reorganise  territories
according to patterns designed to make them more competitive, more efficient and better
prepared to meet globalisation’s financial  challenges is based on the assumption that
territories have the inner capacity to act as a regulating and driving force. Nevertheless,
territories do not intrinsically hold such abilities: they are subjected to circumstances
such as the inertia of inherited structures and to multiple decisions from stakeholders
whose motives are often far from political. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Foucher M., 1993. Fragments d'Europe. Fayard.
Rivière D., 2014. L’Italie de la crise. Les cafés Géo (www.cafe-geo.net/litalie-de-la-crise)
Vanier M., 2002. Recomposition territoriale française : la voie française. L'information géographique
, p. 99-112.
NOTES
1. This idea can also be found, in a more modern and secular form, in pre-first world War Austro-
Marxist projects to organise the Austro-Hungarian Empire into federations based on autonomous
ethnic communities rather than territories. 
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